I participated in an Oxford-style debate at The Economists’ Buttonwood Gathering a couple of weeks ago. The proposition for the debate was Financial Innovation Boosts Economic Growth.
On
the pro side of the proposition were Myron Scholes, the chairman of
Platinum Grove and Robert Reynolds, the CEO of Putnam, and on the con
side were Jeremy Grantham, the CEO of GMO and me. This was the first
time I had participated in a formal debate, as I suspect it was for the
others. When we came out onto the stage, I overheard one person in the
audience say, with a British accent, “Well, they obviously have never
been in an Oxford debate before.” I don’t know what we did wrong, but it looks like we even messed up our entrance.
The entire debate is available on the Economist site (scroll to the video "Debate on Financial Innovation") and here.
It includes five-minute opening remarks by each participant – first
Robert for the pro, then me for the con, then Myron and finally Jeremy.
This was followed by questions from the moderator and audience and then
closing one-minute Clarence Darrow-moment summations. The debate is
pretty interesting, but for those who do not want to spend the time
watching it, here are the main points I made.
I elected to restrict my discussion of financial innovation and economic growth in two respects.
First,
I focused only on the so-called innovative products. I grant that there
are some innovations in the financial markets that have been
beneficial; Robert Reynolds gave a summary of many of these. I take as
a given that electronic clearing, the adoption of telecommunications,
the development of futures, forwards and mutual funds have all had a
positive impact.
So
what do I mean by innovative products? Well, I could just say you know
them when you see them. But when I think about innovative products, I
think about them in a three dimensional space. I look at where the
product fits in the dimension of simple to complex, standard to
customized, and transparent to opaque. The things I term innovative
products congregate in the {complex, customized, opaque} region.
Second,
I focus on the impact of financial innovation over the past ten or
fifteen years. I am looking to the past rather than forecasting the
future for two reasons. One is that I do not have a crystal ball, so I
cannot project what innovations will occur in the future. Another is
that if the future ends up looking like the past, then at least the
past can provide a guide. Behavior being what it is, absent regulation
to bridle our actions, this is a reasonable assumption to make.
So,
defining innovative products in this way and looking over the past ten
or fifteen years, let’s look at the ways financial innovation might
promote economic growth.
Do innovative products promote growth by increasing market efficiency?
If
we were in an Arrow-Debreu world, the answer would be yes, since these
products will help span that space of the states of nature. But the
incentives behind innovation move in the other direction. The objective
in the design and marketing of innovative products is not market
efficiency, but profitability for the banks. And market efficiency is
the bane of profitability. The last thing a bank would want is a
competitive, efficient market, because then it would not be able to
extract economic rents. So the incentives are to create innovative
products that reduce market efficiency, not enhance it.
How
is this done? Well, I can quickly think of two ways. First, by creating
informational asymmetries, by having products that are difficult for
the users to understand an price. And the second is by designing
innovative products, which, due to their non-standard nature, allow the
banks to extract higher transaction costs.
Do innovative products promote growth by allowing us to manage risk better?
Hardly.
They create risk, or, if you don’t want to go that far, they hide
risks. They put risks off balance sheet, obfuscate them through complex
schemes, create non-linearities and correlations that only become
evident in times of large market changes. They also push more risk into
the tails, so that in the day-to-day world things look more stable, but
in an extreme event the losses are accentuated.
Earlier
in the conference, Larry Summers gave an address where he remarked that
since the early 1980s we have had a major financial crisis roughly
every three years. Whatever financial engineering and the innovations
it creates is doing for the markets, it is not tempering risk.
Do financial innovations help meet investors’ needs?
Unfortunately,
the answer is yes. Well, not investor needs, but investor wants. They
allow investors to lever when they aren’t supposed to lever, take
exposure in markets where they are not supposed to take exposure, avoid
taxes, take on side bets in markets where they have no economic
interest. I go through some of the uses of derivatives for gaming and
gambling in my Senate testimony from June.
Do innovative products promote capitalism?
The
answer to this is yes and no. We get capitalism when things are going
well, and socialism when things are going poorly. I went through this
in a recent post.
Innovative
products are used to create return distributions that give a high
likelihood of having positive returns at the expense of having a higher
risk of catastrophic returns. Strategies that lead to a ‘make a little,
make a little, make a little, …, lose a lot’ pattern of returns. If
things go well for a while, the ‘lose a lot’ not yet being realized,
the strategy gets levered up to become ‘make a lot, make a lot, make a
lot,…, lose more than everything’, and viola, at some point the
taxpayer is left holding the bag.
If
we were to look at the sorts of strategies employed by large investment
firms and banks, my bet is we would see a bias toward short volatility,
short gamma, short credit and short liquidity. All facilitated with
innovative products – you can’t really do the first two without
derivatives – and all leading to these sorts of return characteristics.
This
was a debate, so we all took the polemic positions. I am not so extreme
as to hold that all innovative products, even those that do fit in the
{complex, customized, opaque} corner, are devoid of value. But just
because we are able to take some cash flow and turn it into an
instrument doesn’t mean we should. Here are three questions we can ask
to determine if a new, innovative product makes sense:
- Is there a standard, simple instrument that could do the job – either one that already exists or one that can be created.
- Is
the primary purpose of the new instrument to meet economic objectives
(i.e. helping to get capital to the producers or helping producers
layoff risks) or to meet non-economic objectives (i.e. gaming the
system, making side-bets on the market).
- Does
the instrument create negative externalities; on the margin does it
increase the risk of market crisis, does it make the market more
levered, complex and opaque?
Originally published at
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