Of the many issues that I have been warning about concerning banks,
their balance sheets and the risks that they take, one of the (and
there are a few) most underappreciated is the currency risk of the
"mother of all carry trades". See Roubini Not Alone in Fearing Dollar Carry Trade and Roubini Sees `Huge' Asset Bubbles Growing in `Mother of All Carry Trades'.
Investors
worldwide are borrowing dollars to buy assets including equities and
commodities, fueling “huge” bubbles that may spark another financial
crisis, said New York University professor Nouriel Roubini.
“We
have the mother of all carry trades,” Roubini, who predicted the
banking crisis that spurred more than $1.6 trillion of asset writedowns
and credit losses at financial companies worldwide since 2007, said via
satellite to a conference in Cape Town, South Africa. “Everybody’s
playing the same game and this game is becoming dangerous.”
The
dollar has dropped 12 percent in the past year against a basket of six
major currencies as the Federal Reserve, led by Chairman Ben S.
Bernanke, cut interest rates to near zero in an effort to lift the U.S.
economy out of its worst recession since the 1930s. Roubini said the
dollar will eventually “bottom out” as the Fed raises borrowing costs
and withdraws stimulus measures including purchases of government debt.
That may force investors to reverse carry trades and “rush to the
exit,” he said.
“The risk is that we are
planting the seeds of the next financial crisis,” said Roubini,
chairman of New York-based research and advisory service Roubini Global
Economics. “This asset bubble is totally inconsistent with a weaker
recovery of economic and financial fundamentals.”
As
has been the case at least twice in the past, I am in agreement with
the man. The amount of bubbliciousness, overvaluation and risk in the
market is outrageous, particularly considering the fact that we haven't
even come close to deflating the bubble from earlier this year and last
year! Even more alarming is some of the largest banks in the world, and
some of the most respected (and disrespected) banks are heavily
leveraged into this trade one way or the other. The alleged swap hedges
that these guys allegedly have will be put to the test, and put to the
test relatively soon. As I have alleged in previous posts (As the markets climb on top of one big, incestuous pool of concentrated risk... ),
you cannot truly hedge multi-billion risks in a closed circle of only 4
counterparties, all of whom are in the same businesses taking the same
risks.
Click to expand!

See
the following for a backgrounder on my opinion before we move on to the
risks of currency volatility and interest rate swaps in the "Too Big To
Fail, but Too Big to Let Survive Intact" club:
So, How are Banks Entangled in the Mother of All Carry Trades?
Trading revenues for U.S Commercial banks have witnessed robust growth
since 4Q08 on back of higher (although of late declining) bid-ask
spreads and fewer write-downs on investment portfolios. According to
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, commercial banks'
reported trading revenues rose to a record $5.2 bn in 2Q09, which is
extreme (to say the least) compared to $1.6 bn in 2Q08 and average of
$802 mn in past 8 quarters.
High dependency on Forex and interest rate contracts
Continued growth in trading revenues on back of growth in overall
derivative contracts, (especially for interest rate and foreign
exchange contracts) has raised doubt on the sustainability of revenues
over hear at the BoomBustBlog analyst lab. According to the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency, notional amount of derivatives
contracts of U.S Commercial banks grew at a CAGR of 20.5% to $203
trillion by 2Q-09 from $87.9 trillion in 2004 with interest rate
contracts and foreign exchange contracts comprising a substantial 84.5%
and 7.5% of total notional value of derivatives, respectively. Interest
rate contracts have grown at a CAGR of 20.1% to $171.9 trillion between
4Q-04 to 2Q-09 while Forex contracts have grown at a CAGR of 13.4% to
$15.2 trillion between 4Q-04 to 2Q-09.
In terms of absolute dollar exposure, JP Morgan has the largest
exposure towards both Interest rate and Forex contracts with notional
value of interest rate contracts at $64.6 trillion and Forex contracts
at $6.2 trillion exposing itself to volatile changes in both interest
rates and currency movements (non-subscribers should reference An Independent Look into JP Morgan, while subscribers should reference
JPM Report (Subscription-only) Final - Professional, and
JPM Forensic Report (Subscription-only) Final- Retail).
However, Goldman Sachs with interest rate contracts to total assets at
318.x and Forex contracts to total assets at 11.2x has the largest
relative exposure (see
Goldman Sachs Q2 2009 Pre-announcement opinion 2009-07-13 00:08:57 920.92 Kb,
Goldman Sachs Stress Test Professional 2009-04-20 10:06:45 4.04 Mb,
Goldman Sachs Stress Test Retail 2009-04-20 10:08:06 720.25 Kb,).
As subscribers can see from the afore-linked analysis, Goldman is
trading at an extreme premium from a risk adjusted book value
perspective.

As a result of a surge in interest rate and Forex contracts, dependency
on revenues from these products has increased substantially and has in
turn been a source of considerable volatility to total revenues. As of
2Q-09 combined trading revenues (cash and off balance sheet exposure)
from Interest rate and Forex for JP Morgan stood at $2.4 trillion, or
9.5% of the total revenues while the same for GS and BAC (subscribers,
see
BAC Swap exposure_011009 2009-10-15 01:02:21 279.76 Kb)
stood at $(196) million and $433 million, respectively. As can be seen,
Goldman's trading teams are not nearly as infallible as urban myth
makes them out to be.
Although JP Morgan's exposure to interest rate contracts has declined
to $64.5 trillion as of 2Q09 from $75.2 trillion as of 3Q07, trading
revenues from Interest rate contracts (cash and off balance sheet
position) have witnessed a significant volatility spike and have
increased marginally to $1,512 in 2Q09 compared with $1,496 in 3Q07.
Although JPM's Forex exposure has decreased from its peak of $8.2
trillion in 3Q08, at $3.2 trillion in 2Q09 the exposure is still is
higher than 3Q07 levels. Even for Bank of America and Citi , the
revenues from Interest rate and forex products have been volatile
despite a moderate reduction in overall exposure. With top 5 banks
having about 97% market share of the total banking industry notional
amounts as of June 30, 2009, the revenues from trading
activities for these banks are practically guaranteed to be highly
volatile in the event of significant market disruption - a disruption
aptly described by the esteemed Professor Roubini as a rush to the exit
in the "Mother of All Carry Trades" as the largest macro experiment in
the history of this country starts to unwind, or even if the
participants in this carry trade think it is about to start to unwind.
The table below shows the trend in trading revenues from Interest rate and Forex positions for top banks in U.S.
Click to enlarge...
Banks exposure to interest rate and foreign exchange contracts
With volatility
in currency markets exploding to astounding levels (with average
EUR-USD volatility of 16.5% over the past year (September 2008-09)
compared to 8.9% over the previous year), commercial and
investment banks trading revenues are expected to remain highly
unpredictable. This, coupled with huge Forex and Interest rate
derivative exposure for major commercial banks, could trigger a wave of
losses in the event of significant market disruptions - or a race to
the exit door of this speculative carry trade. Additionally
most of these Forex and Interest rate contracts are over-the-contract
(OTC) contracts with 96.2% of total derivative contracts being traded
as OTC. This means no central clearing, no standardization in
contracts, the potential for extreme opacity in pricing, diversity in
valuation as well as a dearth of liquidity when it is most needed - at
the time when everyone is looking to exit. Goldman Sachs has
the largest OTC traded contracts with 98.5% of its derivative contracts
traded over the counter. With the 5 largest banks representing 97% of
the total banking industry notional amount of derivatives and most of
these contracts being traded off exchange, the effectiveness of
derivatives as a hedging instrument raises serious questions since most
of these banks are counterparty to one another in one very small, very
tight circle (see the free article, "As the markets climb on top of one big, incestuous pool of concentrated risk... ").
The table below compares interest rate contracts and foreign exchange contracts for JPM, GS, Citi, BAC and WFC.
JP Morgan has the largest exposure in terms of notional value with
$64,604 trillion of notional value of interest rate contracts and
$6,977 trillion of notional value of foreign exchange contracts. In
terms of actual risk exposure measured by gross derivative exposure
before netting of counterparties, JP Morgan with $1,798 bn of gross
derivative receivable, or 21.7x of tangible equity, has the largest
gross derivative risk exposure followed by Bank of America ($1,760 bn,
or 18.1x). Bank of America with $1,393 bn of gross derivatives relating
to interest rate has the highest exposure towards interest rate
sensitivity while JP Morgan with $154 bn of Foreign exchange contracts
has the highest exposure from currency volatility. We have explored
this in forensic detail for subscribers, and have offered a free
preview for visitors to the blog: (
JPM Public Excerpt of Forensic Analysis Subscription 2009-09-18 00:56:22 488.64 Kb), which is free to download, and
JPM Report (Subscription-only) Final - Professional, or
JPM Forensic Report (Subscription-only) Final- Retail as well as a free blog article on BAC off balance sheet exposure If a Bubble Bubble Bursts Off Balance Sheet, Will Anyone Be There to Hear It?: Pt 3 - BAC).


Subscribers, see
WFC Research Note Sep 2009 2009-09-30 13:01:30 281.29 Kb, ~
WFC Off Balance Sheet Exposure 2009-10-19 04:25:53 258.77 Kb ~
WFC Investment Note 22 May 09 - Retail 2009-05-27 01:55:50 554.15 Kb ~
WFC Investment Note 22 May 09 - Pro 2009-05-27 01:56:54 853.53 Kb ~
Wells Fargo ABS Inventory 2008-08-30 06:40:27 798.22 Kb to expound on our opinions of Wells Fargo, below.

Subscribers, see
MS Simulated Government Stress Test 2009-05-05 11:36:25 2.49 Mb and
MS Stess Test Model Assumptions and Stress Test Valuation 2009-04-22 07:55:17 339.99 Kb
Factors contributing to record trading revenues in 1H09
In 1H09 trading revenues were positively impacted by strong activity in
interest-rate and money-market products, steep yield curves and
declining short-term rates which usually help banks generate
mark-to-market gains on their investment portfolio. As per the OCC
2Q2009 report, one of the major factors that contributed to record
trading revenues was the changes in the value of derivatives payables
and receivables. During 2Q09, following results of the stress tests for
large banks, credit spreads had narrowed down sharply. The net effect
of these changes to the fair values of derivatives payables and
receivables, which contribute to trading revenues, had a material
impact during 2Q09. In addition, the banks also benefited from wider
margins (bid-ask spreads) due to lower competition and reduced risk
appetite amongst existing players.
Are record Fixed Income Currency and Commodities (FICC) revenues sustainable in the long run......?
The record trading revenues reported by commercial banks were on back
of low investment write-downs and higher bid ask spread. After
reporting record trading revenues of $9.8 bn in 1Q09, the revenues from
this segment is under pressure. In 2Q09, the trading revenues declined
to $5.2 bn and further the declining trend continued in 3Q09 as well,
with banks reporting further deterioration in the trading revenues
growth q-o-q. For example, Goldman Sachs' (GS) trading and principal
investment revenues declined by 7.0% q-o-q to $10.0 bn in 3Q09 as
compared to $10.8 bn in 2Q09, while Bank of Americas' trading revenues
fell 5.6% q-o-q to $1.8 bn.
If we look at the actual fundamentals for the previous quarters,
specifically from Q42008 through 3Q2009, we could hardly witness any
significant improvement or sign of economic recovery. Unemployment
levels continue to rise, consumer spending is dismal, retail sales are
declining and bankruptcies across industries are still being witnessed
while CRE losses have yet to peak and we feel residential real estate
losses have reached a faux peak through a combination of governmental
bubble blowing and seasonality. Foreclosures and shadow inventory are
building at a record pace while interest rates are as low as they can
effectively get, and the main value drivers for consumption of
residential real estate: availability of credit, wealth, employment,
and income, have been beaten severely and are still on the downturn at
a time when supply is STILL being introduced into the market at a
dizzying pace in the form of foreclosures and soon to be finished
construction projects tailing off from the end of the credit boom.
Eighteen to 24 month construction cycles are dumping 2007 projects in
our laps right about now, see - "Who are ya gonna believe, the pundits or your lying eyes?"and Who are you going to believe, the pundits or your lying eyes, part 2 . Here, a picture is worth a thousand words...

There ain't nuthin like building thousands of extra condo and apartment
rental units next to empty condo/rental to be lots, as condo/rental
prices plunge amid a glut of condo/rental supply - all funded by banks
leveraging FDIC guaranteed consumer monies!

We may (or may not) have seen the worse, but chances are there is a lot
of pain is still left. This should be witnessed in terms of higher
investment write downs (than in past couple of quarters) in the coming
periods and lower trading revenues which spiralled up off temporary
highly favorable, yet quite unsustainable factors. The bid-ask spreads
(which currently are at high levels by historical standards) have been
beginning to show signs of narrowing of late. This should pull down the
phenomenal growth we have witnessed in recent quarters in the trading
revenues of said banking institutions.
Originally published at
BoomBustBlog and reproduced here with the author's permission.
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