As we pass the anniversary of the Lehman meltdown,
policymakers and the media continue to mark the event with a repetition, yet
again, of the question, “why didn’t economists see this coming?” Beyond the
mere point – made by many economists in response to Paul Krugman’s recent New
York Times Magazine – that there are many different types of economists, a vast
minority of which specialize in the combination of financial markets and
macroeconomics necessary to make such an observation and even fewer who
understood securitization prior to the crisis (a set that excludes Mr.
Krugman), is that those few who did see it coming also know how it ends.
You see, rather than just indicated by macroeconomic or
financial market imbalances, this crisis is really just a boring rerun of
crises repeated on a lesser scale over the past several decades of
securitization market development. Recall the subprime automobile
securitization crisis of the mid-1990s, the subprime credit card crisis of the
mid-late 1990s, the high-LTV mortgage crisis of the late 1990s, the subprime
home equity crisis of the early 2000s, and the aircraft lease and 12b1 fee
securitization crises of the early-mid 2000s. All involved new untested asset
classes whose performance could not be adequately predicted by investors. All
involved warehouse funding that evaporated quickly when the ability to fund
long-term through securitization markets was removed. And all resulted in a
substantial decline in securitization of the collateral asset class after the
crisis.
That decline is what is before us today. While the economy
could continue to grow more or less unhindered in the face of a reduction in
subprime automobile loans, subprime credit cards, niche high-LTV mortgage
loans, or second-lien home equity loans, each crisis was economically more
disruptive than the last. Eventually, reasoning that each successive crisis
still had not had a significant macroeconomic effect, regulators and markets
scaled the industry even larger until we finally did have a macroeconomic impact – called a recession – that
resulted from the necessary credit disruption.
So now the question is how do we grow without subprime and
pay-option first lien mortgages? Moreover, given the disruption to first-lien
mortgage securitization markets overall, how do we grow without securitization?
This is not an academic question. At its peak prior to the crisis,
securitization (including that from the GSEs) was funding roughly $9 trillion
of consumer lending. Comparing that with insured deposits of roughly $6
trillion, it is easy to see that securitized funding is crucial to the banking
industry and that expecting to grow with roughly a third of pre-crisis bank
funding is not going to be easy.
So while we can sit and continue to wonder why the crisis
happened and why nobody noticed, it makes more sense to look at parallels from
similar crises. Using those observations, the asset class of (at least)
subprime and pay-option mortgage lending will be a mere fraction of its
pre-crisis importance, not because of government restrictions but because of
the natural limits of investor demand. Of course, government policy can skew
the outcome, either artificially suppressing the sector to the detriment of economic
growth or artificially supporting the sector through subsidies that will
encourage the sector to re-bubble and pop more violently than recently
witnessed in the name of homeownership.
I would propose a middle ground: support continued
development of sound securitizations while allowing fringe applications to
experience the throes of development. Subprime first-lien and pay-option loan
securitization was uneconomic, and needs to retreat before occupying its
appropriate (small) niche in the mortgage world. The Alt-A and prime loan
categories beg for regulatory classification, and mortgage lending to those
segments begs for regulation to determine conformity with those classifications
to avoid the category arbitrage that resulted in “stealth Alt-A” and “stealth
prime” infiltrating the core of the securitization world.
Securitization has contributed significantly to capital
deepening in financial markets and concomitant economic growth. It is not
necessarily wise to throw that out because of recent market disruptions.
Nonetheless, securitization markets need to be protected from misuse in order
to provide economic benefits. Hence, a better way forward might be to protect
the integrity of securitization markets, while realistically seeing their limitations.
So while two years into the crisis some remain curious about the “why,” it is
more important to focus on the “lessons learned.”
† Hermann
Moyse, Jr./Louisiana Bankers Association Professor of Finance, Louisiana State
University, Senior Fellow at the Wharton School, and Partner, Empiris LLC.
Contact information: joseph.r.mason@gmail.com;
(202) 683-8909 office. Copyright Joseph R. Mason, 2009. All rights reserved.
Past commentaries and testimony are blogged on http://www.rgemonitor.com/financemarkets-monitor/bio/626/joseph_mason.